
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a scenario of GAME THEORY[1] developed in the 1950s by Merrill Flood, Melvin Dresher and Albert W. Tucker. It demonstrates the conflict between individual and collective interests when two suspects are separately offered a deal by the police. Each can either co-operate (remain silent) or defect (testify against the other). If both remain silent, each serves 6 months; if one confesses, the silent suspect serves 10 years. Mathematically, confessing is the dominant strategy, leading to a sub-optimal outcome in which both suspects confess. The scenario has been expanded to the iterated version, where repeated interactions can foster co-operation through strategies such as Tit for Tat. It has wide-ranging applications in understanding strategic interactions in economics, politics[2] and social sciences, illustrating how rational self-interest can lead to collectively worse outcomes.
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O prisoner's dilemma refers to a problem of GAME THEORYThis is a clear but atypical example of a problem of non-zero sum. In this problem, as in many others, it is assumed that each playerThe player, who is independent, wants to maximise his own advantage without caring about the other player's result.
Standard game theory analysis techniques, such as determining the Nash equilibriumThis can lead to each player choosing to betray the other, although both players get a more favourable outcome if they collaborate. Unfortunately for the prisoners, each player is individually incentivised to defraud the other, even after the reciprocal promise of collaboration. This is the key point of dilemmaIn other words, should or shouldn't the selfish prisoner collaborate with his neighbour without betraying him, so that the group's advantage, equally distributed, can be maximised?
No prisoner's dilemma iterated, a co-operation can be obtained as a result of balance. Here you play repeatedly, and when you repeat the gameIn an iterative process, each player is offered the opportunity to punish the other player for not co-operating in previous games. Thus, in an iterative process, the incentive to defraud can be overcome by the threat of punishment. punishmentThis leads to a better, more co-operative result.